In defense of the monarchs after Napoleon

In response to the post that shed an unflattering light on the Concert of Europe and the Congress of Vienna:

It's not a matter of dispute that each monarch acted extravagantly in his own interests by protecting his power with sometimes undue force.  This, though, is a little bit of a simplification:  "Stability, for these monarchs, meant stability of their power, not necessarily of the lives of the people over whom they ruled."  In the volatile post-Napoleonic Europe that these monarchs were ruling in, stability of their power was in fact stability for their subjects.  Whether or not stability was desired, stability was what was being offered.  The freedoms that were suppressed at this time were the cost of this stability.  Each leader feared that a revolution in Europe (which would necessarily be overthrowing a so-called legitimate government) would every time result in the complete immolation of European stability.  The fact that the Concert of Europe supported (visibly and invisibly) the Greek revolution against the Ottomans is not contrary to these codes in the sense that the Greek revolution, unlike, say, a possible Polish uprising, was legitimate:  it was rendering unto Europe what was Europe's.  Also, a revolution in Greece destabilized the Ottomans, not Europe, and was not a threat to the stability of the legitimate governments of the Concert.